Author: Bitcoin Magazine Pro
Compiled by: Plain Language Blockchain
Bitcoin is facing its first real existential threat , not from government bans or market crashes, but from quantum computing . The 1.1 million bitcoins (worth approximately $100 billion) stored in Satoshi Nakamoto's wallet, along with about 25% of the total circulating supply , are currently exposed to outdated encryption keys that are highly vulnerable to quantum attacks . When quantum computers mature—whether in 5 years or 25 years—these bitcoins will be cracked.
Threat
Bitcoin's security relies on the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) . These algorithms make it extremely difficult to forge a Bitcoin signature mathematically without knowing the private key. For a traditional computer, cracking such a signature would take millions of years. However, quantum computers operate entirely differently ; they have the potential to solve the discrete logarithm problem behind ECDSA in minutes or hours .
Not all Bitcoins face the same risks. Early peer-to-peer K (public-key payment) addresses (including Satoshi Nakamoto's addresses) had their public keys directly displayed on the ledger . For these Bitcoins, a quantum computer is essentially a "master key" that can directly access the wallet. In contrast, later address types (such as peer-to-peer KH) hide the public key behind a cryptographic hash , only exposing it when a transaction is initiated. This creates a brief vulnerability window : theoretically, a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could intercept the transaction between when you reveal your public key to transfer funds and when it is packaged and confirmed by a miner.
Uncertainty of timeline
The timeline for quantum computing is highly uncertain. It may arrive within a year, or it may never materialize. But uncertainty is the enemy , because Bitcoin needs proactive migration , not passive adaptation. If quantum computers emerge before Bitcoin has migrated to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) , Bitcoin will be utterly defeated. Hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of public keys will be exposed, and attackers could begin stealing Bitcoin and dumping it on the market, causing a devastating price crash .
In the best-case scenario, the timeline for implementing a PQC solution is 6 to 12 months just to finalize the code and reach consensus; depending on the degree of signature optimization, the migration process may require an additional 6 months to 2 years .
Token Burning
The question is whether a deadline should be set to "destroy" those Bitcoins that haven't been migrated to quantum-resistant addresses by the deadline . If approximately 20-30% of the supply were unlocked (breached) simultaneously, Bitcoin would face a massive crisis of confidence , and its "hard currency" argument would collapse. A supply dump of this scale would create bear market conditions and potentially jeopardize Bitcoin's entire philosophy.
However, destroying tokens faces significant philosophical hurdles . It essentially means that Bitcoin could become confiscated property . If the network decides it can redeem itself by destroying tokens, what prevents governments or controllers from deciding which addresses (such as the assets of terrorists or dissidents) can be destroyed and censored? This would set a precedent for destroying sovereign individual ownership of assets .
primary goal
Bitcoin is the world's largest "honeypot." It's the only financial network where you can directly steal value and have 24/7 liquidity to cash out . The US dollar can't do this—stealing large sums of money will result in blocked transfers, and even if hacked, institutions will refund customers. Bitcoin doesn't have this luxury; it's purely built on trust in the code .
If someone achieves quantum computing power to crack encryption, Bitcoin wallets will become the prime target because they are easier to liquidate and offer a first-mover advantage. If the money has already been taken by the first hacker, a second hacker will gain nothing.
in conclusion
While such survivability-level vulnerabilities have long been acknowledged in cryptographic literature, the window for preventative action is narrowing , demanding immediate strategic attention from miners, exchanges, wallet providers, and individual stakeholders. The real test lies not in the existence of the threat, but in the network's ability to coordinate and systematically migrate to quantum-resistant signature algorithms before the advent of quantum computers with sufficient computing power .
