Author: Zen, PANews

If the GENIUS Act of 2025 was the "constitutional moment" for stablecoins in the United States, then the new draft regulations proposed by the FDIC in April 2026 officially ushered in the "enforcement era".

This week, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) published a proposed rule in the Federal Register, setting a nearly two-month comment period, ending on June 9. The rule provides clear constraints and guidance regarding the issuance of stablecoins by banks and their fintech subsidiaries.

In short, the FDIC is working to translate the “Guiding and Establishing a National Stablecoin Innovation Act” (GENIUS Act), which was signed into law in 2025, into a more specific and actionable list of operational guidelines and regulatory rules.

What gives the FDIC the right to speak? Is its regulatory power truly legitimate?

To understand the significance of this draft, we must first understand the background of the FDIC.

The FDIC, short for Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, is an independent federal agency established by Congress. Its core responsibilities include providing insurance for bank deposits, inspecting and regulating the safety and soundness of financial institutions, and handling the aftermath of bank failures.

The FDIC directly regulates a large category of state-chartered banks and savings institutions that are not part of the Federal Reserve System. Therefore, it inherently has the authority to set rules regarding the safety, soundness, capital, liquidity, customer protection, and deposit insurance coverage of its regulated entities. In China, this corresponds to the functions of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC).

Therefore, the FDIC itself also has certain regulatory authority to issue draft guidelines on stablecoins. If a bank or its subsidiary wants to issue a new type of liability instrument related to the dollar payment system, the FDIC will naturally be concerned about risks such as capital, liquidity, redemption, custody, information disclosure, and misleading sales.

The draft guidelines released this time are mainly aimed at stablecoin issuers within the banking system regulated by the FDIC, especially "Qualified Payment Stablecoin Issuers" (PPSIs) established by FDIC-regulated depository institutions through subsidiaries, and also cover some custody and safekeeping related businesses.

More importantly, there is direct authorization from the GENIUS Act. This law, signed into law by Trump on July 18, 2025, explicitly requires the FDIC, OCC, Federal Reserve, NCUA, and Treasury Department to develop implementation rules for payment stablecoin issuers within their respective jurisdictions. For the FDIC, it is the primary regulator of stablecoin subsidiaries of state non-member banks and state savings institutions under its supervision.

This also explains its relationship with existing stablecoin legislation: this draft is not new legislation, but rather one of the implementing rules of the GENIUS Act. The GENIUS Act is already the first comprehensive federal-level legal framework for stablecoins in the United States. It requires that only "licensed payment stablecoin issuers" can legally issue such stablecoins in the United States, and stipulates that bank subsidiaries are regulated by their primary banking regulators, while federally licensed non-bank issuers are primarily regulated by the OCC.

The FDIC actually released its first supporting draft in December 2025, which outlined "how bank subsidiaries can apply for approval to issue stablecoins." This draft, released in April 2026, further supplements the substantive requirements for reserves, redemption, capital, liquidity, risk control, custody, and information disclosure after approval. This sends a signal to the banks it regulates: don't even think about skirting the rules regarding deposit insurance and tokenized deposits.

The new regulations detail six key aspects: from "1:1 reserves" to "prohibition of issuing interest."

Looking at this FDIC draft specifically, the most important parts consist of six sections that define the rules of the game for stablecoins within the banking system.

The first requirement is reserve assets . The draft requires issuers to always maintain identifiable reserves covering all circulating stablecoins at a ratio of at least 1:1, and the value of these reserve assets must never fall below the total face value of unredeemed stablecoins. Issuers must also maintain records to link a specific batch of reserves to a specific stablecoin brand.

The FDIC also proposed that if a subsidiary issues multiple stablecoins under different brands, each brand should, in principle, have a segregated, traceable, and separately recorded reserve pool, and they should not be mixed at will , in order to reduce the contagion risk of "one failure affecting the entire pool".

Secondly, the draft law addresses the quality, liquidity, and realizability of reserves . It not only requires issuers to hold identifiable reserve assets at a ratio of at least 1:1, but also emphasizes that these reserves must possess strong realizability to be readily converted into usable funds in the event of redemption pressure . Regarding the use of reserve assets, the FDIC intends to explicitly restrict arrangements such as re-pledging and reuse of reserve assets.

For repurchase arrangements based on short-term U.S. Treasury bonds, the draft proposes a conditional framework. However, for reverse repurchase arrangements, opinions are still being solicited regarding "how excess collateral should be defined and whether more specific constraints are needed," and a fully clear set of restrictions has not yet been established.

Third is the "T+2" deadline for redemption . The FDIC requires issuers to disclose their redemption policies, including redemption timeframes, redemption procedures, and minimum redemption amounts. The draft proposes to define "timely redemption" as completion within two business days of submitting the application.

Furthermore, any discretionary restrictions on timely redemption can only be approved by the FDIC, not by the issuer itself. The minimum redemption threshold cannot exceed one stablecoin, ensuring equal rights for retail investors.

Fourth is the "positive and negative list" of activities . The FDIC limits the "core activities" of payment stablecoin issuers to issuance, redemption, reserve management, and limited custody/depository services . Other activities can only be direct support for these core activities, and whether something constitutes "direct support" is subject to regulatory interpretation.

The draft also explicitly sets forth several important restrictions:

• It must not imply that its stablecoin is guaranteed by the credit of the U.S. government.
• It is prohibited to imply that the property is covered by federal deposit insurance.
• Users should not be paid interest or returns simply because they hold or use stablecoins.
• Issuers are prohibited from lending money to customers to purchase their own stablecoins, as this would introduce leverage into the "1:1 reserve" structure.

Fifth is the flexible management of capital, liquidity, and risk . The FDIC did not simply copy the standard capital ratios for banks, but proposed a more flexible framework. The PPSI must use at least CET1 and AT1 capital instruments as the basis for regulatory capital, while establishing a process for self-assessment and meeting capital requirements. If the business is more complex and riskier, the FDIC can increase capital or set additional backup requirements. The FDIC believes that if an issuer only engages in the narrowest issuance and redemption business, the capital requirements may be lower. However, as more ancillary activities are undertaken, the importance of capital increases.

Sixth is the weekly and monthly reporting system for information disclosure . The draft requires issuers to disclose the composition of reserve assets on their official websites monthly, and simultaneously publish redemption policies and related fee information . Issuers must also submit confidential weekly reports to the FDIC . More importantly, the monthly reserve disclosure is not solely the responsibility of the issuer; the draft also requires a registered accounting firm to examine the monthly report and issue a written report. Furthermore, the issuer's CEO and CFO must submit certifications to the FDIC regarding the accuracy of the monthly reports . By linking public disclosure, third-party inspections, and senior management accountability, the requirements for ongoing compliance and information accuracy are significantly enhanced.

A more sensitive point is that the FDIC explicitly states that deposits held in banks as stablecoin reserves should not be subject to FDIC insurance claims by stablecoin holders under the "look-through deposit insurance" framework. It also clarifies that if a "tokenized deposit" essentially meets the definition of a "deposit," it will not be treated differently under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act simply because it is on-chain or tokenized. In other words, stablecoins are not deposit-insured products, but genuine "tokenized deposits" may still be deposits and protected by insurance .

How impact will the new regulations have?

This draft is currently only a proposed rule, not a final rule, and its scope is not limited to all stablecoin projects, but only to banks/subsidiaries and related custody activities within the FDIC's regulatory system. The FDIC itself estimates in its economic analysis that in the first few years, only 5 to 30 FDIC-regulated institutions may apply for and be approved to issue tokens through their subsidiaries, and the number of institutions providing related custody services will also be in the dozens.

However, in terms of institutional impact, this proposed new regulation is crucial. First, it represents a true step towards implementing the GENIUS Act, transforming abstract legislation into enforceable regulation. Furthermore, together with the parallel implementation rules proposed by the OCC in February and the AML/sanctions rules proposed by the Treasury Department in April, it is piecing together a complete federal regulatory framework for stablecoins . Finally, it will significantly impact the future competitive landscape, giving institutions with stronger compliance capabilities, capital strength, and banking infrastructure a greater advantage than the "asset-light, marketing- and revenue-subsidized" crypto-native model.

In particular, the draft law's restrictions on paying interest/returns to holders, its restraint on reserve reuse, and its strict limitations on FDIC insurance provisions may enhance the relative advantage of bank-affiliated and highly compliant issuers.

Therefore, this draft should not be viewed in general terms as a major boon to cryptocurrencies. Rather, it represents a crucial step for the US in further refining the regulation of stablecoins into concrete regulatory texts. From a legislative perspective, it falls below the GENIUS Act, but from a practical perspective, it is far more important than political rhetoric.

Traditional banking giants with licenses, ample capital, and the ability to tolerate low profits and rigorous audits are about to usher in their own era of compliant stablecoins. The stablecoin landscape in the United States is about to experience a new upheaval.