Lawyer Shao Shiwei | The 6.5 billion stablecoin cross-border exchange case in Shanghai exposed the regulatory dilemma: Why is it difficult to stop the chaos of virtual currency with strict policies?

On July 16, 2025, the People's Court of Pudong New Area, Shanghai, announced a cross-border illegal currency exchange case involving a total amount of 6.5 billion yuan. The protagonist this time is no longer the traditional underground bank or cash, but the "stable currency" represented by USDT. In fact, this is not the first time that the official has reported a similar case. Since 2017, the high-pressure crackdown on virtual currencies and stable currencies has lasted for many years, but why are similar cases still rampant and even growing in scale?
  • Special statement: This article is an original article by lawyer Shao Shiwei, which only represents the personal views of the author of this article and does not constitute legal advice and legal opinions on specific matters.

On July 16, 2025, the People's Court of Pudong New District, Shanghai announced a cross-border illegal exchange case involving an amount of up to 6.5 billion yuan. The protagonist this time is no longer the traditional underground bank or cash, but the "stable currency" represented by USDT. In fact, this is not the first time that the official has reported a similar case. Since 2017, the high-pressure crackdown on virtual currencies and stable currencies has lasted for many years, but why are similar cases still rampant and even growing in scale?

I Author of this article: Lawyer Shao Shiwei

1

Why did "stable currency" suddenly become "hot"

Recently, the concept of "stable currency" is really a bit too hot. For those who have never paid attention to Web3 and virtual currency, "stablecoin" may still be a slightly unfamiliar term. But as a lawyer who has been deeply engaged in blockchain legal services for many years, I am exposed to related businesses and cases every day. Now, it seems to have "broken the circle".

But in the past few days, the following news events put together, more or less feel a bit magical.

On July 10, 2025, the Party Committee of the Shanghai State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission held a central group study meeting to study the development trends and response strategies of cryptocurrencies and stablecoins.

On July 16, 2025, the People's Court of Pudong New Area, Shanghai announced a major cross-border foreign exchange case using stablecoins as the medium. The case shows that Yang and others operated domestic shell company accounts to provide stablecoins for overseas accounts of unspecified customers, thereby realizing cross-border transfers of funds to obtain profits. The amount of illegal foreign exchange transactions in the past three years has reached 6.5 billion yuan.

On July 18, 2025, US President Trump officially signed the Guidance and Establishment of a National Innovation Act for Stablecoins in the United States (hereinafter referred to as the Genius Act) at the White House, marking the first time that the United States has formally established a regulatory framework for digital stablecoins.

At the same time, Hong Kong will also officially implement the Stablecoin Regulatory Ordinance on August 1, 2025, becoming the world's first jurisdiction to establish a comprehensive regulatory system specifically for legal stablecoins.

Putting these things together, on the one hand, major financial centers such as China, the United States, and Hong Kong are promoting the compliance and financialization of stablecoins; on the other hand, some domestic law enforcement agencies still regard stablecoins as a typical scenario of "illegal financial activities."

This misalignment of regulatory rhythm and institutional concepts seems to remind us: It's time to re-examine the real role and institutional position of "stablecoins."

2

Why do black and gray industries love stablecoins so much?

The reason why underground banks choose virtual currency (especially stable currency represented by USDT) as the first choice for cross-border foreign exchange is that it technically breaks through the multiple bottlenecks faced by traditional foreign exchange, such as quota limit, fund pool pressure, time limit for arrival, identity concealment and jurisdiction differences. This also directly leads to the failure of regulatory policies in the face of "virtual currency anonymity risk" and "virtual currency money laundering risk".

The first is the problem of "quota limit". According to my country's personal annual foreign exchange purchase quota system, each person can only purchase a maximum of US$50,000 per year. Traditional underground banks often rely on splitting heads and forging trade documents to circumvent this restriction. However, after the emergence of stablecoins, on-chain transfers through encrypted assets such as USDT or BTC can completely bypass this quota limit and realize a one-time cross-border transfer of millions of dollars.

The second is the problem of "fund pool pressure". In the past, underground banks needed to prepare foreign exchange positions in both domestic and foreign places, which was high risk and costly. Stablecoins break the logic of bilateral reserves. As long as RMB is collected domestically, currency-to-fiat currency conversion can be completed instantly in overseas exchanges, and the threshold for starting has rapidly dropped from tens of millions to hundreds of thousands of yuan.

The third is the "timeliness of arrival". Traditional bank wire transfers usually take T+1 to T+3 working days, and a series of compliance materials must be submitted. In contrast, on-chain transfers can be completed within an average of 10 minutes to 1 hour, operating around the clock and without holiday restrictions, which greatly improves the efficiency of capital circulation. This also makes customers generally willing to pay 1% to 3%, or even higher fees in exchange for "rapid arrival".

The fourth is the "identity concealment" problem. Traditional cross-border remittances often leave a relatively complete regulatory chain through bank statements, customs declarations, etc., while in virtual currency transactions, with the help of on-chain address obfuscators, desensitized wallets and overseas exchanges, the connection between the flow of funds and the real identity is cut off at multiple levels, the difficulty of investigation by law enforcement agencies has increased significantly, and the case-solving cycle has also been significantly extended.

Finally, there is another regulatory arbitrage point that is frequently used by the gray industry: the difference in jurisdictions. Traditional currency exchange needs to deal with both domestic and foreign supervision at the same time, but with the help of stablecoins as a cross-border medium, illegal funds often complete the final legal currency landing in jurisdictions with loose supervision. Even if domestic accounts are frozen, foreign funds can still be safely withdrawn, thus achieving free movement in "different regulatory regions."

It can be said that the intervention of stablecoin technology has not only reconstructed the operation mode of illegal currency exchange, but also greatly magnified the efficiency and concealment of black and gray industries. This low-threshold, decentralized, and strong cross-border tool is becoming a new technical infrastructure for the "gray flow" of cross-border funds.

3

Why does the country continue to crack down on virtual currency-related crimes with high pressure?

my country's high-pressure crackdown on virtual currency-related crimes is based on the following two core regulatory logics:

First, virtual currencies have natural anonymity and cross-border liquidity, which makes it difficult for traditional financial regulatory systems to effectively penetrate and easily be used to conceal and transfer illegal income.

In the "Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Money Laundering" implemented on August 20, 2024, the behavior of "through virtual asset transactions" has been officially listed as one of the methods of money laundering, which means that the judicial organs' crackdown on "virtual asset money laundering" has entered a clear and institutionalized stage.

Secondly, as a country that implements strict foreign exchange controls, the borderless nature of virtual currencies can easily become a technical tool for evading regulation and achieving illegal foreign exchange.

Such behavior not only disrupts the financial order, but also has a substantial impact on macroeconomic regulation and national economic security, mainly including:

  • Statistical distortion: Since the virtual currency transaction chain is not controlled by local regulatory agencies, the actual outflow of foreign exchange cannot be accurately included in the official statistical caliber, resulting in a "data black hole" in the balance of payments and foreign exchange reserves;

  • Macroeconomic control failure: The central bank cannot accurately grasp the real situation of foreign exchange supply and demand in the market, and may misjudge the timing of exchange rate and interest rate adjustments, affecting the effectiveness of policies, and even need to use a large amount of real reserves to "fill" the outflow gap;

  • Tax and asset loss: Illegal exchange of virtual currency to avoid taxes leads to the loss of deposit reserves, cross-border tax sources and anti-money laundering data in the settlement and sale of foreign exchange.

Since the 2017 "September 4th Notice" first clearly defined virtual currency-related businesses as illegal financial activities, regulatory efforts have been continuously strengthened. The "Card Cutting" special operation launched in 2020, while combating traditional bank card crimes, also prompted underground banks, online gambling gangs, etc. to gradually switch funding channels to digital asset tools such as stablecoins. Even though the "924 Notice" in September 2021 reiterated that virtual currency-related businesses are illegal financial activities, in reality, due to the high liquidity, low threshold, and strong concealment of stablecoins, their use has become more active in the gray industry.

It is also in this context that a group of intermediaries who "buy low and sell high" arbitrage have emerged, commonly known as "U merchants" - they do not directly participate in cryptocurrency projects, nor do they get involved in upstream links such as money laundering and gambling, but they are often accused of suspected illegal operations, assisting information network criminal activities, concealing criminal proceeds, and other high-incidence crimes for providing matchmaking transactions and earning exchange rate differences. They are also the "high-risk marginal group" involved in criminal procedures in current judicial practice.

Lawyer Shao Shiwei | Shanghai's 6.5 billion stablecoin cross-border exchange case exposes regulatory dilemma: Why is it difficult to stop the chaos of virtual currency with severe policy crackdowns?

4

Can stablecoins really be "eliminated" by continuous policy suppression?

From the "September 4th Announcement" in 2017, to the "September 24th Notice" in 2021, and to the continuous crackdown on virtual currency transactions and illegal exchange since 2023 across the country, the density and intensity of regulatory policies have been significantly enhanced. However, as a lawyer who has handled a large number of criminal cases in the field of virtual currency, illegal business, and illegal foreign exchange, and who can be said to be a "witness" in the handling of each criminal case, I have been constantly thinking in the process of handling each criminal case:

Can this continuous and severe crackdown really achieve the purpose of effectively combating crime and punishing illegal and criminal activities?

This question arises because in many of the cases I have come into contact with or handled, there are many such situations:

Those arrested are "marginal figures":

Whether it is the virtual currency trading platform cases I have handled, or underground banks, foreign exchange companies, and money laundering networks, a very common phenomenon is that those arrested are often ordinary employees who work for wages, "drivers" who help move money, middlemen who introduce foreign exchange and charge a small commission, and U merchants who make a profit by buying low and selling high. Of course, there are also corrupt officials involved in such cases. But these people are often neither decision makers nor the core of the chain, let alone the real beneficiaries.

The principal offender is on the run and it is difficult for law enforcement to catch him:

The operators and big bosses of many cases have already fled abroad or even changed their nationality. Transnational law enforcement has costs. In fact, my client mentioned to the case handler many times that the principal offender was in Hong Kong, China, but the case handling unit did not take the initiative to arrest him because the mainland police also have no law enforcement power in Hong Kong.

The country's losses are difficult to recover, and the high-intensity investment of judicial resources has limited returns:

Take the cross-border online gambling case involving 400 billion yuan in turnover cracked by the Jingmen police in Hubei in 2022 as an example. The case is known as the first "virtual currency first case" in the country where the court ruled to confiscate the currency.

It took nearly two years from filing the case to the verdict, and a lot of manpower and material resources were invested. Although the court finally made a confiscation judgment on "partial freezing of virtual currency", according to insiders, the actual amount recovered was far lower than expected.

The reason is that a large number of assets involved in the case are stored in overseas trading platforms or overseas company accounts in the form of virtual currency. For example, Tether, the issuer of USDT, is registered in the United States. Chinese law enforcement agencies hope that it will cooperate with judicial seizure, but they also face many practical difficulties.

5

The reality of law enforcement in fragmented strikes is not a cure for the root cause

The above problems reveal a reality: for the main culprits who really do evil, the cost of breaking the law is often just to let "marginal figures" serve their sentences as scapegoats; and for those who are caught, they are just a link in the entire chain - neither the organizers nor the planners, nor do they have the ability to bear the consequences of the entire chain. Although the crackdown of criminal law is deterrent, in practice, "introducers", "transporters" and "exchangers" have become the main targets of punishment, and it is difficult to cure the root cause.

At the same time, it is worth pondering whether the large amount of police force and law enforcement resources invested by the state in each case can be exchanged for systematic governance effects. Let us review the typical cases reported by the authorities in recent years:

  • Shanghai Pudong Court announced a major case of illegal cross-border exchange of 6.5 billion stablecoins. Yang used 17 shell companies to manipulate cross-border "counter-trading" (2025)

  • Beijing police cracked a 2 billion yuan virtual currency serial case, using USDT for "cross-border counter-trading" to provide RMB-foreign currency exchange channels for gamblers, cross-border e-commerce, etc. (2024)

  • Shandong Qingdao police and The Qingdao Branch of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange jointly cracked a major underground money laundering case, involving a total amount of 15.8 billion yuan (2023)

  • Hubei Jingmen police cracked the first virtual currency case in the country, and Hubei Jingmen police cracked a cross-border online gambling case, involving a turnover of 400 billion yuan (2023)

  • Zhejiang Hangzhou Court sentenced Zhao and others to illegal business operations by collecting dirhams in Dubai, purchasing USDT, and selling RMB in China, involving a turnover of 400 billion yuan (2023)

  • data-pm-slice="0 0 []">43.85 million yuan (2022)

  • Shanghai Baoshan Court sentenced Guo Mouzhao, Fan Mouxun and others to set up websites such as "tw711 platform" and "fire speed platform" for illegal foreign exchange, involving a turnover of 220 million yuan (2022)

In practice, there seems to be a sense of loss of control of "the more you block, the more leaks" and "the bigger the fight, the bigger it gets". The country hopes to achieve a warning effect for the whole society through punishment of individual cases, but the actual situation is that everyone is an island, trapped in their own information cocoon. Before the incident, these people may not have paid attention to the relevant news, or even if they saw it, they did not realize the seriousness of the problem and whether it was related to them.

6

We actively abandoned the dominance of stablecoins

If fighting against gray industries is "defense", then leading the legal alternative path should be "attack". But unfortunately, in this field, we abandoned our own initiative.

Looking back at the past, China was once the world's largest stablecoin country. Today, the founders of exchanges that are well-known in the global currency circle - Binance, OKX, Gate.io, Huobi, Matcha, etc. are almost all Chinese. Once, the exchange operation team was located in China, and the currency circle information platform developed in clusters. Most users used RMB or RMB stablecoins to complete virtual currency transaction settlements.

But now, all this has become a thing of the past. If it were not for the continuous introduction of policy barriers, which forced project parties, platform operators, and investment teams to shut down or choose to go overseas, China would have had a great chance to dominate the entire stablecoin ecosystem. And now those who stay in China are often just low-level workers.

In addition to policy blockade, my country is also trying to find another way. Since 2016, the central bank has launched the research and development of digital RMB, clearly put forward the goal of publicly issuing digital currency, and Yao Qian served as the first director of the Digital Currency Research Institute. Its design goal, to some extent, is to benchmark the US dollar stablecoin, and try to achieve the following intentions through digital RMB:

  • Reduce dependence on the US dollar channel, use digital RMB for settlement in cross-border trade, investment, aid and other scenarios, bypass SWIFT and the US dollar clearing system, and reduce the risk of international sanctions;

  • Repress capital flight and illegal exchange, and replace the role of USDT and USDC in the underground financial system from a technical level;

  • Provide an "official", compliant, and fee-free digital cash tool for enterprises and individuals to weaken the gray attraction of stablecoins.

However, due to the lack of extensive application scenarios and ecological support for the digital RMB, even though the technical level is basically ready, the market acceptance is still sluggish, and the forced melon is not sweet. This path has not formed a truly effective payment alternative. If users do not pay, it is not feasible to force promotion by administrative orders.

In addition, there is a little black humor. On November 20, 2024, the official report on Yao Qian’s serious violations of discipline and law mentioned that he abused his power during his tenure, provided "close" support to specific technology companies, and was suspected of using virtual currency for power-for-money transactions, becoming the key training target of those "hunters" who should have been regulated.

The failure to promote the digital RMB to achieve policy goals proves the limitations of the political path on the one hand, and also highlights the other side of the "ban" on stablecoins on the other hand: policy resistance has not eliminated the problem itself, but has made the gray path more hidden and the underground transactions more complex and hidden. For existing supervision, it has brought more troubles.

7

What are the advantages of stablecoins? What are the use scenarios?

On July 18, 2025, US President Trump signed the Genius Act, which formally established the regulatory framework for digital stablecoins. In this regard, Sun Lijian, director of the Financial Research Center of Fudan Development Research Institute, publicly commented: "The US dollar stablecoin is essentially a tokenized projection of the US dollar in the blockchain world and a digital extension of the US dollar hegemony. It has magnified the global penetration of the US dollar through technical means, but it has also brought new systemic risks. For countries, stablecoins have also become a new battlefield for monetary sovereignty games."

Looking back, what we used to regard as dregs seems to be regarded as a treasure by our opponents. At the same time, it has now become a weapon for our opponents to counter us?

From a technical perspective, stablecoins are a programmable digital asset that is anchored to the value of legal currency and runs on a blockchain network. Its core mechanism is to map the book value of legal currency to homogeneous tokens on the chain through the custody of off-chain reserve assets (such as US dollars, RMB, etc.). It can be transferred without relying on bank accounts, relying on smart contracts for automatic execution, and has the characteristics of high efficiency, decentralization, and low cost.

For this reason, stablecoins are widely used in the following typical scenarios:

  • Cross-border trade settlement: enterprises can use USDT or USDC and other US dollar stablecoins to achieve cross-border payments in seconds, greatly reducing foreign exchange fees and settlement cycles;

  • Free trade zone and bonded warehouse payment system: In the free trade zone, RMB stablecoins can be used for one-click account splitting, covering warehousing, customs, logistics and other scenarios;

  • Supply chain finance: platform enterprises Use stablecoins to discount accounts receivable and automatically complete multi-level split transfers between upstream and downstream;

  • Carbon trading and digital asset markets: "On-chain credit assets" with stablecoins as the target can achieve 7×24 hours of automatic matching, improving the liquidity of assets such as carbon credits and digital rights;

  • B-end and C-end payment tools: As a seamless intermediary in payment scenarios such as cross-border salary payment, overseas study payment, offshore financial management, and margin management, stablecoins can effectively connect the "last mile" between the traditional financial system and the on-chain economy.

We must see that stablecoins may indeed be used for illegal activities such as money laundering and private foreign exchange, but they also have practical positive uses, which is why the United States, Hong Kong, China, Singapore and many other places are actively trying to explore the design of "compliance sandboxes" for them.

Therefore, when evaluating the regulatory policy of stablecoins, we should not only focus on its risk labels such as "anonymity" and "borderless", but also need to deeply understand its value in cross-border payments, financial services, industrial collaboration, etc. Instead of completely excluding it from the system, it is better to face up to its logic of action and think about how to use it in a controllable way.

8

Stablecoins are not a tool for crime, and the lack of system is the root of the problem

Stablecoins are not a natural tool for crime, but a carrier of the new financial structure. Whether it will be abused depends on whether the system can follow up in time. Blindly suppressing cannot hinder the rapid development of technology. At the same time, what we lose is not only the failure of supervision to meet expectations, but also the global competitiveness that could have been mastered. (In fact, it seems that we have never actively strived for and actively built it).

From my experience as a criminal lawyer, the vacuum of the system brings substantial law enforcement difficulties.

First, there is a system vacuum and the case-handling units are lagging behind in their understanding.

Domestic policies blindly suppress and deny the value and significance of virtual currencies, and lack relevant legal basis and case-handling guidelines. In fact, from the perspective of law enforcement, this is not conducive to the smooth handling of cases and the correct implementation of the law.

We represent Web3-related criminal cases in many places across the country and frequently deal with judicial authorities at different levels. It can be said responsibly that the vast majority of grassroots case-handling personnel still lack basic understanding of the technical principles and operating mechanisms of blockchain. This requires our lawyers to popularize basic concepts to case-handling personnel, and the second step is to start arguments about legal disputes.

For example, in a recent Web3 case we represented, the local judicial authorities hoped that our client would voluntarily hand over hundreds of millions of virtual currencies as "illegal gains", but the presiding judge of the case asked us in the communication with us before the trial: What do these strings of letters and numbers (addresses, transaction hashes) mean? ——The case handler who decides the fate of the parties knows nothing about this field, but this is the norm for us to handle a large number of criminal cases involving virtual currency, Web3 project parties, and exchanges.

Second, the crackdown strategy is fragmented, and law enforcement behavior is like "whack-a-mole".

At present, my country's regulatory path for stablecoins and virtual currencies has not formed a systematic compliance guide. From the perspective of the prosecution, cases involving virtual currency and Web3 often lack clear boundaries in terms of characterization, which can easily lead to vacillation in the application of the law, and also make law enforcement officers exhausted and always trapped in the "whack-a-mole dilemma".

The judicial organs have long relied on "plugging loopholes and catching the current" to maintain the bottom line, which is destined to be a high-cost, low-output method. As long as there is real demand in the market, as long as there is still room for cross-border payments and on-chain transactions, there will always be "alternative solutions" to be developed. At this time, catching "marginal people" and sealing "downstream ports" is just a continuation of the traditional logic of combating crime, which is destined to treat the symptoms but not the root cause, and it is difficult to form a truly sustainable governance system.

Really effective institutional construction is neither "purely relying on crackdowns" nor "building behind closed doors", but to build a system that achieves a dynamic balance between security and efficiency. This is the direction that financial governance should take in the future.

9

Conclusion

The real way out is not to block technical tools such as "stablecoins", but to build a compliant ecosystem that can guide, replace and regulate, so that virtual currency regulatory policies can play a precise and effective role. Let those who should be cracked down have nowhere to hide, and let those who should be used be used for our own purposes.

#Stablecoin cross-border compliance#Evolution of virtual currency regulation#Policy containment and institutional dilemma#USDT compliance risk observation#Virtual asset policy game#Web3 financial legal risks

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Author: 邵诗巍

This article represents the views of PANews columnist and does not represent PANews' position or legal liability.

The article and opinions do not constitute investment advice

Image source: 邵诗巍. Please contact the author for removal if there is infringement.

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